When Diaspora Politics Meet Global Ambitions: Diaspora Institutions Amid China's Geopolitical Transformations

Abstract

Through a case study of China, one of the largest emigration states and a rising global power, this article probes how a homeland state envisions diaspora politics amid geopolitical transformations. Drawing on historical, policy, and interview data, I argue that China's changing positioning toward Chinese emigrants, triggered by the state's geopolitical vicissitudes, has reshaped and repurposed diaspora institutions. I find that since the 2010s, China's diaspora policies have shifted away from soliciting diasporic support for domestic economic growth and national unification and toward liaising externally with migrants to expand Chinese soft power abroad. In consequence, diaspora institutions with more extensive overseas connections and flexible working experiences have taken precedence over formal state agencies specialized in domestic policymaking. This article makes two theoretical contributions to a multilevel understanding of diaspora politics as traversing simultaneously the domestic and global political fields. First, following neo-pluralism, I examine China's diaspora bureaucracy as composed of a diverse set of state entities with distinctive, or even contradictory, interests, orientations, and philosophies. These organizational variations shape diaspora institutions’ different strengths and fluctuating significance in China's shifting geopolitical strategies. Second, by situating emigrants and diaspora institutions in the macrohistorical framework of world politics, this article pushes research on diaspora politics into more profound dialog with world-systems theory. Rather than assuming an asymmetric interdependence between weaker emigration countries and hegemonic immigration countries, I demonstrate how an aspirational homeland state seeks to challenge this established world order and accomplish its geopolitical ascendancy through diaspora re-strategizing and institutional reshuffling.