National Cultural Frames and Muslims’ Economic Incorporation: A Comparison of France and Canada

Abstract

This article shows that differences in the economic incorporation of Muslims and other immigrant minorities in France and in Canada are mainly related to immigrant selectivity, labor market structures, and welfare transfers. Differences in ethno-specific penalties due to national cultural frames — related to multiculturalism in Canada and secular republicanism in France — are small, affect only the second generation, and are related both to minority household patterns and to treatment in mainstream institutions. Using data on household incomes from two large-scale surveys (Trajectories and Origins in France 2008–2009 and the Canadian National Household Survey 2011) and taking account of cross-setting differences in Muslim and other minority origins, we model cross-generational economic trajectories reflecting the impact of immigrant selectivity, labor market structures, and welfare transfers. Within this framework, we examine four ways that cultural frames may affect minority economic disadvantage: the significance of religion relative to race, citizenship access, labor market discrimination, and minority household patterns, including employment of women in couples and intergenerational cohabitation. Across all minorities, we find a striking cross-national difference in intergenerational economic trajectories: flat in France and upward in Canada, plausibly reflecting institutional differences. Net of sociodemographic controls, both religion and race matter in each setting, and net Muslim disadvantage is similar in each. Citizenship differences have little impact. Labor market earnings discrimination appears similar. A small potential effect of cultural frames appears in second-generation Muslim households: in France, lower female employment rates reduce household incomes, while in English-speaking Canada, more frequent cohabitation with more affluent parents increases household incomes. Yet even these findings do not necessarily diminish the overriding significance of immigrant selectivity, labor market structure, and welfare transfers.