Do Interest Group Endorsements Cue Individual Contributions to House Candidates?

Abstract

Non-incumbents face an uphill battle in their quest to raise sufficient funds to compete effectively against seated House incumbents and, alternatively, in competitive open-seat House contests. Interest group endorsements are thought to contribute to their electoral success, but whether endorsements help non-incumbent House candidates raise contributions from individuals, as a component of this success, remains unknown. Their heavy reliance upon individual contributions to finance their campaigns as well as the prominence of the groups making a large number of endorsements justifies an explicit test of this relationship. Using contribution data from the U.S. Federal Election Commission (FEC) between 2006 and 2012 paired with endorsement tabulations in both a set of regression and matching analyses, I uncover evidence that endorsements increase individual contributions to the candidate over the course of the election cycle. The results underpin the value of endorsements to non-incumbent candidates as well as their utility for the endorsing groups wishing to influence House elections.