An American hedge fund in Japan: Exploring the role of investor relations as a form of false signalling

Abstract

Focusing on the case of Shinsei Bank Limited, this article explores the role of Investor Relations (IR), which has become a major activity among large Japanese firms. This is an iconic case of the recent, controversial, intrusion of Shareholder Value Added (SVA) management into corporate Japan since the bank’s takeover by an American investment fund, Ripplewood Holdings LLC. Qualitative interview data with current and former employees of Shinsei demonstrate that drastic changes to corporate form and practice have occurred since the takeover. However, although Shinsei’s public claims were based around a move towards SVA management, the actual processes of the restructuring do not, in reality, seem to be genuinely associated with SVA. The bank’s IR act as a form of ‘false signalling’ intended to hide an undisclosed business model: effectively a form of ‘narrative management’ used to obscure their true style of restructuring. Interestingly, this smoke-screening did not work effectively, and criticism from employees and outsiders became severe.