Evolutionary game analysis of land income distribution in tourism development

Abstract

Social stability is the key to the sustainable development of tourism destinations. And reasonable distribution of land revenue during tourism development can effectively avoid social conflicts at these destinations. This study explores the dynamic nature and stabilization of land revenue distribution for tourism development. It does so by developing an evolutionary game model. In this model, the main stakeholders include the government, developers and local communities, and analysis of the model indicates that the process of distributing land revenue is profoundly influenced by land transfer methods. Specifically, a developer chooses land transfer methods by weighing the land cost (consisting of land prices and taxes) or the benefit under non-cooperation with different land transfer methods. Meanwhile, the local community chooses whether to cooperate by considering the land income (consisting of land prices) or non-cooperative benefits. With different game sequences, the stakeholders will consider different conditions. Moreover, government taxation and subsidization policies are found to have little influence on the land transfer market in the long run. Instead, to avoid potential conflicts and social instability, the government should provide a good political environment for community participation. This study offers important implications for policymaking involving land income distribution for tourism destinations.