Organizational Behavior and Disaster: A study of conflict at NASA

Abstract

This paper examines how groupthink led to conflict in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), with a focus on the Challenger and Columbia shuttle tragedies. We will show that, although there were technical causes of the accidents, there are deeper root causes that constitute a recurring thread. Throughout NASA's history, there have been budgetary and scheduling constraints. In an attempt to meet these externally imposed restrictions, management has unconsciously and repeatedly fallen into the psychological tendencies of groupthink. A bulletproof attitude amongst NASA officials was a direct cause of the Challenger accident. Management began tolerating increasing amounts of “acceptable flight risks.” Management compromised safety, one of the quality components of the project management “triple constraint” of schedule, budget, and quality. As a result of this disdain for managing quality, the second accident occurred with a chilling sense of déjà vu. We will examine the root causes of the pressure on management, as well as the traps of conflict that have befallen management.