When Do Shareholder Agreements Add Value? Mitigating Superprincipal-Agency Conflicts in Family Firms-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

When Do Shareholder Agreements Add Value? Mitigating Superprincipal-Agency Conflicts in Family Firms

Published:2024-03-28 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:1042-2587
Container-title:Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
language:en
Short-container-title:Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice

Author:

Jaskiewicz Peter¹,Belot François²,Combs James G.¹³^ORCID,Boutron Emmanuel⁴,Barrédy Céline⁴

Affiliation:

1. Telfer School of Management, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, Canada

2. Université Paris-Dauphine, Université PSL, CNRS, DRM, 75016 Paris, France

3. College of Business, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA

4. CEROS – University Paris Nanterre, Nanterre, Île-de-France, France

Abstract

Researchers are divided on whether shareholder agreements (SAs) improve or hurt firm value. We offer family firms as a context where SAs add value and explain why; SAs limit “superprincipal” agency conflicts between family owners and other family members. A panel of French firms and a second study of French Initial Public Offerings show shareholders value SAs more in family than in nonfamily firms. Among family firms, SAs add greater value when weak governance undermines family owners’ resistance to other family members’ demands. Our study helps reconcile competing theory about SAs and distinguishes superprincipal conflicts from other family-firm agency problems.

Publisher

SAGE Publications

Link

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/10422587241238006

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