Intergovernmental environmental affairs division and environmental public services supply: Evidence from 289 cities in China

Abstract

The reasonable division of intergovernmental environmental affairs is the institutional basis for solving environmental pollution problems. This paper conducts an empirical test using panel data from cities in China. We find that: (a) environmental decentralization significantly improves the supply efficiency of environmental public services (ESE). It's mainly because of the increased capacity for green technology innovation and urban environmental infrastructure development brought about by environmental decentralization. (b) Environmental decentralization will improve the ESE more effectively in regions with the central government acting as a binding force, high environmental preferences, governance capacity of local governments, and pollutant emission intensity. (c) Higher promotion incentives for officials may distort the pollution control effect of environmental decentralization and inhibit the ESE. Appropriate central government transfer payments can better utilize the positive role of environmental decentralization.