Local governance in the centralized French system of policing: From co-production to conflict of legitimacy

Abstract

This article deals with the complex aspect of French public safety policies and offers a big-picture view of the factors that impact both their design and their implementation processes. Indeed, many players are involved in their development: city mayors and local police forces when they exist, but also local agents of the national police forces who have the main responsibilities in this field, and the Public Prosecutor. Whereas cooperation between national police forces and local authorities is statutory and needed in order to address safety issues, conflicts and tensions are not rare. Each stakeholder pursues their own objectives: mayors are seeking public support and try to meet local expectations, while national police chiefs favour priorities set by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Far from following only a rational choice process, the implementation of local safety policy results from power relationships and the position of each player in the game. To gain the upper hand over a partner, a stakeholder can rely on material resources but also on the control of information about security issues, knowledge and expertise in this field, and its legitimacy among the public. In the French case, two forms of legitimacy are in conflict as far as security policy is concerned. If mayors base their arguments on their status conferred by a democratic election, the police chiefs use the fact that they belong to a national service based on a principle of equality – even if it is not applied: every citizen has the same rights and duties, and is subjected to national policies. Because the French Republic does not recognize communities and local peculiarities, institutions tend to favour their own positions rather than dealing concretely with the safety issues.