Minding the body: A critical appraisal of three phenomenological accounts of embodiment in social work literature

Abstract

Summary In the few social work publications dedicated to exploring phenomenological philosophical concepts, embodiment or the lived body, promoted especially by phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, seems to have received special attention. Roughly, and according to a phenomenological philosophical perspective, the lived body signifies a mind–body unity that is believed to constitute acts of human perception, including social perception. This article aims to critically appraise three accounts of embodiment in social work literature, focusing on issues of application for the sake of clarifying the value and relevance of applied phenomenology in social work practice. After providing an overview of the reception of phenomenology in the social work literature, and introducing the three cases to be explored and their respective application of Merleau-Ponty's concept of the lived body, the article discusses Merleau-Ponty's own view on phenomenology, followed by a critical discussion of the three cases. Findings An applied phenomenology of embodiment turns out to be an ambiguous proposal, while simultaneously posing a challenge to the common-sense notion of professional reflection in face-to-face interaction between professional and client. The value of applying a phenomenology of embodiment to social work practice must arguably correspond to the question of how the lived body of the professional is disclosed reflectively in the encounter with other bodies, rather than simply how professionals adopt a theory to make sense of bodily experience at work. Applications This article contributes to clarifying the social situatedness of professional reflection, while also strengthening the case for phenomenological social work by exploring issues of application.