To sign or not to sign? Union strategies towards provincial metal sector agreements in the Catalan and Basque automotive industries

Abstract

I compare collective bargaining in the Basque and Catalan automotive industries to show that since the early 2000s, two contrasting bargaining frameworks have emerged. The two largest Spanish unions have followed ‘top-down’ strategies in Catalonia, in which organizing the rank and file was secondary to signing the provincial agreement. This has created a relatively passive membership with little capacity to confront management. By contrast, the main Basque union refused to give priority to signing a provincial agreement and adopted a devolved strategy, resulting in higher unionization rates and more frequent strikes. I conclude, first, that union (renewal) strategies do in fact matter in the regulation of global industries and, second, that when unions modify their strategies, the organizational and bargaining dynamics also change, producing institutional configurations that embody new contradictions and dilemmas.