Affiliation:
1. Department of Political Science, University of Houston,
2. Department of Political Science, UCLA,
Abstract
A portrayal of the bill-to-law provisions of Latin American constitutions as extensive game forms shows presidential veto powers to be richer, more varied, and more regionally distinctive than hitherto appreciated. Small details and apparent redundancies are surprisingly consequential, the distribution of institutional advantages is both counterintuitive and incompatible with any simple pattern or overall measure of ‘presidential power’, and regional peculiarities turn out to have been rather well designed to encourage democratic responsibility and executive-legislative agreement more than executive dominance or interbranch deadlock.
Subject
Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
48 articles.
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