Directional equilibria-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Directional equilibria

Published:2018-07 Issue:3 Volume:30 Page:272-305
ISSN:0951-6298
Container-title:Journal of Theoretical Politics
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Theoretical Politics

Author:

Chung Hun¹,Duggan John²

Affiliation:

1. School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan

2. Department of Political Science and Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA

Abstract

We propose the solution concept of directional equilibrium for the multidimensional model of voting with general spatial preferences. This concept isolates alternatives that are stable with respect to forces applied by all voters in the directions of their gradients, and it extends a known concept from statistics for Euclidean preferences. We establish connections to the majority core, Pareto optimality, and existence and closed graph, and we provide non-cooperative foundations in terms of a local contest game played by voters.

Publisher

SAGE Publications

Subject

Sociology and Political Science

Link

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0951629818775515

Reference22 articles.

1. Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model

2. Consensus in Diverse Corporate Boards

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4. Spatial implementation

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