Institutions and Legacies: Electoral Volatility in the Postcommunist World

Abstract

The postcommunist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have witnessed levels of electoral volatility higher than both Western Europe and Latin America, levels that have deleterious effects on party consolidation and representative democracy in the region. This article presents a model of postcommunist legislative electoral volatility, testing explanations developed in Western Europe and Latin America and refining them for the different experi ence of the twin transition to both democracy and capitalism. Pooled cross-sectional time series regression analysis is conducted on 67 legislative elections in 19 countries, covering the 1991-2006 period. Results demonstrate that, contrary to previous studies in other regions and of the first decade of the postcommunist era, economic determinants of volatility are of minimal salience. Rather, the institutional arrangement of the electoral system is found to be critically important, as is the more thorough “Leninist” or “Soviet” legacy in the states of the former Soviet Union.