The Flexible Few: Oligarchs and Wealth Defense in Developing Democracies

Abstract

Based on an original large- N dataset of individual Ukrainian oligarchs and qualitative evidence, this article tests competing perspectives on the political power of big capital. We find, surprisingly, that neither the assumption of direct power by the oligarchs nor the mobility of oligarchic assets helps tycoons protect their fortunes against shocks. Instead, the indirect strategies of party support and media ownership significantly enhance business wealth. Empirically, we profile postcommunist oligarchs by examining the political and economic activities of 177 oligarchs from 2006 to 2012. Theoretically, we contribute to the literatures on instrumental and structural power of capital, and on the interactions between extreme wealth, rule of law, and democracy. In doing so, we contrast the logic of flexibility, according to which oligarchs benefit from political adaptability and deniability, with the logic of commitment compensation, according to which oligarchs benefit from direct power when the rule of law is weak.