IMF Conditionality, Threat Perception, and Political Repression

Abstract

This article investigates the impact of International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality on political repression. Conditionality refers to the conditions that borrowing countries must implement before they can receive loans from the IMF. An original contribution is made by analyzing this impact using quantitative techniques for samples of developing countries covering 1980 through 1982. A more comprehensive model of political repression, focusing on political leaders' hypothetical reactions to and perceptions of challenges from society and on the constraints on their ability to react to the challenges, is also developed and tested. This comprehensive model receives the strongest support. The results show that political repression tends to be used as a response to threats from society, especially for leaders who have few resources at their disposal, who are constrained by certain IMF conditions, and who assumed power unconstitutionally. However, the overall evidence regarding the impact of IMF conditionality is mixed.