Choosing A Coalition Partner

Abstract

In political systems governed by coalitions of parties, popular representation greatly hinges on the extent to which elite political actors heed the coalition preferences of the mass public in their coalition behavior. This article examines elite responsiveness of this type in the German Federal Republic during the 1961–1976 period. The coalition preferences of the German public are shown to favor heavily the party coalitions formed by party elites. While this may hint at popular influence, the probing of change in coalition preferences demonstrates that influence occurs in the reverse direction. That is, most voters attached to one of the major parties (SPD or CDU/CSU), adopt the coalition decisions of their party's leaders as their own preferences. These leaders, as a result, enjoy great leeway in their coalition behavior. However, voters aligned with the third party (FDP) prove far less obliging toward their party leaders. The behavior of these voters, ironically, preserves some leverage at the mass level regarding elite coalition behavior.