Affiliation:
1. Princeton University, USA
2. New York University, USA
Abstract
This article describes how human reasoning differs from standard logics. It tells the story of three sorts of inference, for example: the possibility of rain implies the possibility of no rain; a forecast of rain or snow implies the possibility of rain and the possibility of snow; and a forecast of frost does not imply a forecast of frost or snow or both. People accept these inferences, which each violate the semantics of standard logics. But, they are predictions from the theory that assertions refer to mental models of possibilities that each hold in default of knowledge to the contrary. The moral of the story is that inconsistencies in human reasoning, unlike those in standard logics, have only local consequences.
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献