Service Delivery to the Handicapped

Abstract

In this concluding segment of the three-part series on the federal procurement process and service delivery, the focus is on the appeal-of-award supposition. Following the major topics of program definition and selection of contractors, Part III implies by its very presence that offerors to federal solicitations may need to expand their proposal-preparation procedure to include a monitoring function, one calculated to yield the facts surrounding just how the institution's bid was processed through the agency's procurement model. Why one offer is selected over another remains speculative to an extent — not that it could be otherwise, for the federal procurement process cannot ever be totally objective. Nevertheless, the process must favor objective review, shunning the purely subjective but lending itself to subfective and intuitive insights. Empirical assessment, however, is the backbone of any justifiable evaluation procedure. It is in this arena that marked differences between real/ideal models begin to emerge. The General Accounting Office (CAO) has ruled (January 1979) that there are at least three highly significant points for those preparing offers (1) although appearing to be outside the stated RFP specifications (as interpreted by the offeror), the wfse offeror will rewrite his first offer to accommodate any new “directions” from the Selection Official prior to submtfting the best and final offer; (2) evaluation criteria stated In the RFP/IFB announcement do not display all the criteria, for the sponsor may insert and/or interpret as needed as the process unfolds; and (3) the Technical Review Panel's recommendations do not bind the Selection Official to any one offer, being merely another “low level” step in the procurement process. A case study terminating with this GAO decision is presented for the reader's edification. Under the present model, service delivery to the handicapped or any other target group cannot be maximized. Federal procurements must be responsive to the needs of target audiences. Contractors should be selected for their abilities to deher the most seruices at the lowest possible prices. Cost effectiveness, long a banner useful for campaigning, must become more than a convenient foil in procuring contractors. When practitioners and elected officials insist on federal acceptance of such a procurement model, we can expect an increase in competitiveness within the award process. Insfsting on competition for awards is a responsibility that should be shared by professfonals and other citizens.