Economic Inequality Reduces Preferences for Competent Leaders

Abstract

It is well-documented that economic inequality can harm political stability and social cohesion. In six experiments (total N = 1,907) conducted in China and the United Kingdom, we tested our primary hypothesis that high (vs. low) economic inequality leads to voters’ reduced preferences for competent political leaders. Across studies, this prediction was consistently supported by experimental evidence, regardless of the voter’s social status. We also found that high (vs. low) economic inequality indirectly diminished preferences for competent political leaders through heightened perceptions that politicians were less inclined to care about the populace in a highly (vs. lowly) unequal societal context. In essence, our findings underscore the idea that economic inequality curtails voters’ preferences for competent political leaders by amplifying their concerns about politicians’ indifference to the populace. It also stresses the need for policies and practices to address economic inequality and maintain the vitality of democracy.