Politicizing Priority Departments

Abstract

Presidents have the power to nominate the top ranks of the executive branch and they use it toward their own goals. Presidents need a mixture of experienced and loyal officers to promote bureaucratic competence and responsiveness, and advance their policies within the executive branch, but scholars’ focus has often been senatorial obstructionism rather than when presidents prefer loyal nominees and experienced nominees. This study uses a sample of 573 subcabinet nominations between 1961 and 2006, and relates presidents’ nominee choices to their policy priorities and departmental jurisdictions. It finds that presidents nominate significantly more loyalists and fewer experienced officers to higher priority departments, indicating the importance of responsiveness, as well as their suspicion of experienced officers. Presidents select more experienced nominees for lower priority departments to assure competence where they are least concerned with responsiveness. Furthermore, it finds that increased Senate ideological opposition has no significant effect on presidents’ selections.