Examining the Contingency Value of Certification on Regulatory Burden in a Transitional Economy

Abstract

In transitional economies, the governing central authorities impose heavy regulatory burdens on firms, which results in great costs for business in terms of time, resources, and other constraints. However, quality assurance through decentralized institutions (such as private certified management standards) is rapidly becoming more prevalent. This study examines the contingent implications that such decentralized institutions have for centralized regulation by focusing on the relationship between international certifications and regulatory burdens. As two prominent features of the institutional environment in emerging economies, the threat of competition from the informal sector and corruption may influence the relationship between international certifications and regulatory burdens. These features are therefore examined in terms of their moderating roles. The study draws on institutional and signaling theories to interpret data from a survey conducted by the World Bank in China in 2012. The empirical results show that international certification is negatively associated with regulatory burdens. This relationship is strengthened by the threat of competition from the informal sector, but mitigated by a corrupt business environment. Our study contributes to the institutional literature and to research on international certifications, and it has implications for both business management and governmental policy.