Manipulation in planning: The social choice perspective

Author:

Sager Tore1

Affiliation:

1. Department of Transportation Engineering, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim;

Abstract

The most powerful of the social choice theorems are also highly significant to planning. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, for instance, states that every procedure for choosing from among at least three outcomes is either dictatorial or liable to manipulation, which is narrowly conceptualized as a false revelation of preferences. Planning provides opportunities for many other types of manipulation, but there is not much room for public planning in standard social choice theory, where the ideal is that social decisions should be independent of the procedures leading up to them. However, institutionally enriched social choice theory introduces assumptions about agenda formation and other organizational procedures. The effect is that the entire planniong process is seen to have potential impact on the final decision. A planning version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can then be formulates, which implies that one should not expect utility maximizing planners to always tell the truth in organizational setting where the agents act strategically in pursuit of their own interest.

Publisher

SAGE Publications

Subject

Urban Studies,Development,Geography, Planning and Development

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