Affiliation:
1. Binghamton University, State University of New York
2. Rice University
Abstract
In this research we consider the determinants of economic sanction duration. Why do some sanction episodes last longer than others do? Why do some target states concede faster than others do? To explain the duration of sanction episodes we consider the target's institutional struture and its political stability We develop a theoretical framework based on the target's political features and apply this model to 108 sanction cases using hazard analysis. Our empirical findings indicate that the target state's features, especially its institutional structure and the politcal vulnerability of its regime, significantly impact the duration of sanction episodes.
Subject
Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
69 articles.
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