Inequality Federalism and Economic Self-Interest in Subnational Progressive Tax Politics

Abstract

In a national context of unabated inequality growth and recurrent tax cuts benefiting the wealthy, we have witnessed a notable rise in “inequality federalism,” characterized by subnational initiatives to redress economic inequality through progressive taxation and social spending. While leading research documents the tendency for Americans to fall prey to “unenlightened self-interest” when evaluating complex national tax policy, recent research suggests that the simplicity and clarity of emerging subnational redistributive initiatives facilitates the enactment of economic self-interest, particularly among lower income citizens. This short article builds on prior work by offering the most extensive analysis to date of the role of economic self-interest in public support for subnational progressive tax policies. Drawing upon opinion polls covering eight separate state ballot measures or legislative enactments, we find that in each instance the greatest level of support for the respective progressive tax policy is observed among lower income citizens.