Sanctions as Coercive Diploimacy: The U.S. President's Decision to Initiate Economic Sanctions

Abstract

While economic sanctions are widely believed to be ineffective policy instruments, their use has increased in recent years. Scholars have analyzed the question of sanction effectiveness, but few have approached the conditions that lead to their employment. This article addresses that question: what conditions lead a country to initiate economic sanctions? Focusing on the U.S., both the relations with the target country and the domestic political and economic conditions in America are considered as factors leading to the imposition of economic sanctions. Time-seriescross-section data from 50 countries between 1966-1992 show that the president considers both the relations with the target and American domestic factors when deciding to initiate economic sanctions. However, the relationship with the target is the largest stimulus to sanction use, while the domestic factors only marginally influence the decision. The analysis highlights the importance of economic sanctions as a form of coercive diplomacy aimed at the target and not a White House reaction to domestic demands for action.