Welfare Reform and Comparative Models of Bureaucratic Behavior: Budget Maximizers and Bureau Shapers in the United States and France

Abstract

This paper argues that social problems related to the most disadvantaged citizens require service delivery that is universal, focused, and of reasonable quality. Resource distribution, which makes the delivery of these services possible, is dependent on decision-making structures that pattern relationships between major stakeholder groups, but missing in the debate over welfare reform is a discussion of the decision structures that determine the manner in which policies are formulated, enacted, and implemented. Much of the debate over the choice between markets and bureaucracy is misconceived. Such decision structures are not polar opposites but can work together to provide innovative delivery methods. This research compares evidence from two political systems: the United States and France. Both countries have faced political opposition to welfare policies and both have attempted to counter with administrative and political reforms. This paper probes the differences in those systems and their alternative reforms; it also makes some generalizations about political and administrative decision making and the delivery of remedial services to the most disadvantaged citizens in modern democracies.