Deficits Pro forma and Substantive: Multilevel Policy Implementation in China’s Administrative Approval Intermediaries Reform

Abstract

Policy implementation deficits tend to emerge and expand as implementation moves downward through multilevel administration. This article uses China as an example and examines its policy implementation at both its provincial and prefectural levels under the administrative intermediaries reform policy. By analyzing data from 225 prefectures in China and their component provinces, we identify two types of implementation deficits: deficits pro forma and substantive deficits. We highlight three factors mitigating both types of deficits and their exacerbation from the provincial level to the prefectural level: self-imposed requirements, top-down pressure, and demonstration effects from upper levels. We find that while self-imposed requirements have no binding effect, rigid executive directives from upper levels have the strongest effect on deficits mitigation while demonstration effects also play an important role in deficit reduction. Our research contributes to the implementation literature by distinguishing between pro forma and substantive deficits and by focusing on the middle layer of government as well as the phenomenon of deficit exacerbation across layers.