Evolutionary game model of construction enterprises and construction material manufacturers in the construction and demolition waste resource utilization

Author:

Shao Zhiguo12ORCID,Li Mengdi1,Han Chuanfeng2,Meng Lingpeng3

Affiliation:

1. School of Management Engineering, Qingdao University of Technology, Qingdao, China

2. School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai, China

3. China Institute of FTZ Supply Chain, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai, China

Abstract

With the continuous advancement of urbanization, a huge amount of construction and demolition waste (CDW) is generated in large-scaled construction activities, which has aggravated the problem of environmental pollution, waste of resources and destruction of city appearance. In the context of waste-free city, the recycling of CDW can reduce environmental pollution and promote the sustainable development of a city. However, only 20–30% of CDW in the world is recycled, showing a low rate of global CDW utilization. In order to improve the utilization rate, this paper selects construction enterprises and construction material manufacturers as main participants, applies evolutionary game theory to construct an evolutionary game model on the two parties’ decision-making behaviors in CDW recycling, and uses MATLAB to make a numerical simulation. The aim of the model is to analyze the influence of various factors on the parties’ decision-making behavior evolution and propose strategies to promote CDW utilization. The study found that the stable state of the CDW resource utilization system mainly depends on the difference between revenue and costs, the initial strategy, and the strength of the external environment; for the government, a supervision strategy is found to be necessary, and the best supervision level is 0.6. In the early stage of resource utilization of CDW, subsidies to construction material manufacturers should be increased to improve their initial participation; public participation can effectively improve the efficiency of government supervision, and its optimal participation level is greater than or equal to 0.4; under weak supervision, government penalty increases alone cannot prevent construction enterprises from illegally disposing of CDW. Therefore, the greater the difference, the positive the initial strategy, and the stronger the external environment, the more the behavior of the two participants tends to be {participation, use}. The results show that the government should establish effective supervision mechanisms and legal systems, improve supervision hotlines and information platforms, encourage the public to participate in CDW management and supervision, set appropriate rewards and punishments, strengthen supervision and management levels, reduce supervision costs, and ensure the effectiveness of construction management to improve the efficiency of cooperation between construction enterprises and construction material manufacturers.

Funder

national natural science foundation of china

Publisher

SAGE Publications

Subject

Pollution,Environmental Engineering

Cited by 2 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3