Folk Psychology, Neuroscience and Explanation in Physical Education

Abstract

The traditional practices of physical educationists presuppose a framework of concepts and assumptions which is generally consistent with the common-sense or folkpsychological point of view. It might be supposed that this will in time be superseded by a revised conceptual framework, based on developments in neuroscience. This paper explores the possible relations between the folk and neuroscientific standpoints in terms of their explanatory adequacy for physical education. Four main positions are considered: conceptual dualism, eliminative materialism, reductivism and non-reductive physicalism. It is proposed that only the last of these has any real philosophical plausibility, and that a fundamental constraint on any adequate conceptual framework for physical education must be its capacity to reflect the intrinsic normativity of curricular physical activities.These considerations rule out the prospect of a radical paradigm shift in the theory of physical education.