Fallible Inquiry with Ethical Ends-in-View: A Pragmatist Philosophy of Science for Organizational Research

Abstract

The clash between positivist and constructivist research methodologies in organization studies has sent many researchers to look for a ‘third way’ in critical realism and more recently in pragmatism. Building on John Dewey’s work, this article develops a position where the fallible nature of all knowledge is acknowledged and the value of science is anchored to its ability to resolve genuine human problems. It is argued that this kind of ontological experientialism and epistemological fallibilistic instrumentalism offers the most original and defensible version of pragmatism as a philosophy of science. In it, science is seen as an outgrowth of ordinary inquiry, and thus it starts and ends in experiencing, is always constrained by fallibilism, proceeds utilizing abduction, and instead of ‘knowledge’ it produces warranted assertions. However, as pragmatist inquiry is always done with ends-in-view, pragmatism retains the possibility to evaluate the value of different theories and propositions, and thus sees scientific research as an inherently ethical activity. The position is contrasted to positivism, constructivism, critical realism and more realist interpretations of pragmatism to show its uniqueness, and its basic implications for research practice are explained.