How Authoritarian Regimes Use Organizations to Solidify Control: A theory of pro-forma cooptation and an empirical test from reappointments to congress in China

Abstract

We know that, through lobbying and contributions, organizations systematically seek to influence political outcomes in liberal democracies. But what role do organizations play in an authoritarian regime’s strategy for remaining in power? We argue that in order to maintain stability and consolidate control, an authoritarian regime must actively work to preempt dissent and the emergence of oppositional challengers. When potential challengers are unknown ex ante, the best guess is that they may rise from the ranks of those who run economically powerful organizations. Ability to control these organizations then minimizes the risk of instability. One way in which the regime accomplishes this control is through pro-forma cooptation—the process by which organizational leaders are assigned to positions with nominal authority in the government, thus ensuring their allegiance. We develop a theory predicting which organizations will be targeted for cooptation and posit that absolute and relative size and industry context are the key determinants. Empirical analyses of reappointment to congress of senior business executives in China offer support for the theory. The findings also offer a way to think of cooptation that is different from the conventional view that it drives adaptation (because power sharing widens representation and vested interests). By contrast, pro-forma cooptation of prominent organizations under authoritarian rule reifies the regime’s dominance and solidifies its control, thus promoting inertia through the reproducibility of hierarchy in the social structure.