Decentred Deterrence and the Effects of Social Relations: Explaining Pesticide Regulatory Compliance in China

Abstract

While many have observed the importance of state regulators to the implementation of law, multiple decentralized regulators are crucial for achieving deterrence and compliance. Informed by the deterrence literature, this study conducts in-depth interviews with 150 Chinese farmers and experts and studies how regulated actors perceive detection possibility and sanction impact and how such perceptions shape compliance. The study finds that farmers perceive considerable deterrence risks from multiple actors, helping to explain their pesticide compliance. The study further finds that such perceived threats are linked to social relations or guanxi between farmers and multiple regulators, which are built on frequency of contact, mutual trust and personalized networks among the actors involved. Social relations or guanxi could help to predict sources of deterrent threats and the degree of tolerance for potentially violent actions. Deterrence and regulatory compliance are frequently enhanced when there are close relations between the regulated and regulators. Policymakers and practitioners might want to create a risk environment by first deliberating the relations between polycentric regulation and the generally authoritarian nature of the Chinese state, understanding the regulatory logic of social relations, and then by determining the relevant third parties and formulating policy incentives for utilizing such threats.