Can the Alliance for Progress Succeed?

Abstract

The Alliance for Progress had many origins be fore its proclamation in 1961. Its objectives are admirable, grandiose, and, some of them, contradictory. It is beset by complicated organizational and administrative problems, some of which can be resolved. It is endangered by a continuous massive flight of capital to safe havens abroad, of about the same magnitude as the inflow of our aid. It faces great odds of opposition from the oligarchical sectors in Latin America. The Latin-American governments have also been slow in making plans and quick to change the ones made. At the same time, some of them allege that Washington does not allow for great differences in the various countries and state that it is an error in judgment to leave to the United States the apportion ment of financial and economic support. Others object to the requirement that materials must be purchased in the United States and to the post-Cuban motivation of the Alliance. Nevertheless, there is widespread realization throughout the hemisphere that the hour is very late, that population growth is outrunning economic development, and that the power of the United States to influence events is limited. Some of the ruling military juntas do seem to be social-minded, but the upper strata cannot be induced to accept reforms at the pace we deem essential. There is some hope that liberal Catholic leaders, moving from the base of Pope John's Mater et Magistra, may be able to induce centrist groups to co-operate with the democratic left in a broader advance.