Abstract
The American system of raising campaign funds does not conform to democratic theory. Money itself has qualities which distinguish it from other kinds of political resources. Few Americans contribute; those that do are disporportionately drawn from the upper socioeconomic classes; and big givers and special interests dominate cam paign financing. Equal citizen influence in politics is thwarted by these patterns. Although most individual and group con tributions divide along the same class and policy lines as divide the two major parties, there are many switch-givers who seek advantages by giving to either party or both. Con tributions tend to flow more readily to executive office candi dates, to powerful congressional figures, to incumbents, to close districts, and perhaps to ideological candidates. Wealthy contenders also have an edge. These imbalances diminish vigorous competitive campaigning, which is necessary to alert citizens to their choices in a democracy. Sweeping con gressional reforms in 1971 and 1974 probably reduce the influence of big contributors and broaden citizen participa tion through the income tax check-off. But they do not address other failures of the campaign financing system, and they may create new imbalances and inequalities of their own.
Subject
General Social Sciences,Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
6 articles.
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