‘Theory of Mind’ I: a theory of knowledge?

Abstract

Objective: ‘Theory of mind’ is a cognitive notion introduced by Simon Baron-Cohen and colleagues to explain certain deficits in autistic disorders. It has, however, been extended beyond this, and applied more broadly. It proposes a means of knowing the mind of others, and suggests that this means fails in autism. The epistemological basis of ‘theory of mind’ will be examined critically, not just in terms of its endeavour as a theory of knowledge, but also in regard to the principles that underlie it. Conclusions: The proponents of ‘theory of mind’ eschew the rich field of psychological and phenomenological research, privileging only the biological sciences into which they endeavour to place their theorizations. In doing this, they fail to recognize the epistemological problems involved. This leads to the theory remaining hamstrung by the very Cartesian ontological problems that it seeks to avoid. For some, ‘theory of mind’ is but an artefact of the cognitive approach that it employs. It is argued that these difficulties are compounded by the failure of ‘theory of mind’ to take account of the place of language in the interpersonal encounters it attempts to describe.