Measuring the role of two competing groups of informed agents in opinion formation

Abstract

For politicians, to promote intended messages to different groups of individuals, they could employ strategic individuals called “informed agents.” The aim of this article is to explore and measure the impact of two competing groups of informed agents on opinion dynamics within a society exposed to two extreme opinions. Thus, an agent-based model is developed as an extension to the bounded confidence model by assuming the existence of two groups of informed agents. The impact of these agents with respect to their social characteristics, such as, their size in the society, how tolerant they are, their self-weight and attitudes about others’ opinions is explored. Different assumptions about the initial opinion distributions and their effect are also investigated. Due to the difficulty of observing a real society, social simulation experiments are constructed based on artificial societies.The simulations conducted resulted in some interesting findings. With no dominating group of the two informed agents, the society will be ended up concentrated around a moderate position. On the other hand, with significant difference between the two group sizes, the larger group will polarize the population towards its opinion. However, this conclusion will not apply if the population is skewed towards the other opinion. In such case, the larger group will only succeed to turn some of the society to be more moderate. In a society skewed towards extreme opinion, dominant informed agents adopting the other extreme will not be able to shift the society towards their opinion. Finally, in radical societies informed agents could turn most of the society to be extremists.