How to True Psychology’s Objects

Abstract

Psychology’s current crisis attends most visibly to perceived problems with statistical models, methods, publication practices, and career incentives. Rarely is close attention given to the objects of inquiry—to ontological matters—yet the crisis-related literature does features statements about the nature of psychology’s objects. Close analysis of the ontological claims reveals discrepant understandings: some researchers assume objects to be stable and singular while others posit them to be dynamic and complex. Nevertheless, both views presume the objects under scrutiny to be real. The analysis also finds each of these ontological claims to be associated not only with particular method prescriptions but also with distinct notions of the scientific self. Though both take the scientific self to be objective, one figures the scientist as not always a rational actor and, therefore, requiring some behavior regulation, while the other sees the scientist as largely capable of self-governing sustained through painstakingly acquired expertise and self-control. The fate of these prevalent assemblages of object, method, and scientific self remains to be determined, yet as conditions of possibility they portend quite different futures. Following description of the assemblages, the article ventures a futuristic portrayal of the scientific practices they each might engender.