Another Fine Mess a Preliminary Examination of the Use of Fines by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Abstract

The behavior of regulatory agencies as it relates to our understanding of corporate crime and corporate harm has not been well studied by criminologists. Indeed, examinations of the federal regulatory system and the behavior of its individual agencies have been largely absent from the criminological literature. This article addresses this deficiency by examining the fining practices of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which is charged with upholding a number of federal laws that regulate the automobile industry. We analyzed all cases in four regulatory areas that resulted in fines between 1970 and 1997 and in addition observed the impact of various presidential administrations and the 1970s-1980s oil embargo. The results concur with earlier findings regarding the limited regulatory practices observed during the Reagan administration, and they also suggest that fines have a limited impact on corporate behavior. The article concludes by recommending that future researchers focus on the deterrent value of fines and the shifting influence of social and political changes on regulatory practices within white-collar crime enforcement.