Rico's "Troubled... Transition": Organized Crime, Strategic Institutional Factors, and Implementation Delay, 1971-1981

Abstract

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute, section IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, advanced federalization of the assault on organized crime. The law was aimed primarily at controlling the mob's infiltration into legitimate enterprises. It reflected broad political investment in tools to penetrate the upper echelons of crime groups. Implementation of the statute languished during the 1970s. Explanations for implementation delay have remained at the tactical level, focusing mainly on resource inadequacies and incompetencies within the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Four strategic institutional factors provide amore comprehensive explanation of the overall problem of RICO's implementation delay up to 1981. These factors include the climate of decision-making and turmoil in the presidencies of Nixon, Ford, and Carter, turnover in the Office of the Attorney General, conflict between U.S. attorneys and the Justice Department over federal strike forces, and problematic leadership in the FBI. The life history of the RICO statute demonstrates gaps between rational policy formulation and the cold realities of policy implementation.