Depolicing as Dissent Shirking

Abstract

Theory suggests that bureaucratic actors express opposition to unfavorable organizational and policy changes by acting in ways inconsistent with established rules, norms, and community expectations . Empirical evidence from various professional contexts and geographic locations lends support to the notion that some public employees have indeed engaged in dissent shirking by refusing to perform at their best so as to express work-related dissatisfaction. This research relies on a quasi-experimental design to examine this phenomenon in the context of the police. The study’s analysis will be driven by a series of autoregressive integrated moving average models in order to examine the extent to which a form of dissent shirking—“depolicing”—has occurred in jurisdictions investigated by the U.S. Department of Justice under that agency’s pattern or practice authority. Despite qualitative support for depolicing under these conditions, this analysis shows no evidence that officers responded to external criticism and intensified oversight brought on by the pattern or practice reform process by policing less proactively. Findings are discussed in terms of both theory and policy.