The primacy of the European Central Bank: Distributional conflicts between theory and practice in the pursuit of price stability

Abstract

Whether fighting inflation or deflation, it has been a decade since the European Central Bank (ECB) managed to successfully attain its Treaty-mandated objective, that is, price stability. This is defined by the Bank itself as maintaining an inflation target of ‘below but close to 2% over the medium term’ and, since 2021, as ‘2% over the medium term’. The further reality has veered from policy, the more attention has been brought to the redistributive choices, both implicit and explicit, in the ECB’s pursuit of price stability. The current article analyses this debate in the context of the legal terms stipulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, conceptualised as a function of monetarist theory. It claims that the ECB’s failure to deliver on its price stability objective has contributed to intensifying the re-politicisation of monetary policy, cast doubt on the presumed legitimacy of foundational monetarist theory and caused a legal struggle within EU constitutionalism to sustain a stable distinction between economic and monetary policy.