Cultural psychology and its values

Abstract

This paper discusses two sub-themes emerging from Robert Innis’ article on philosophy and cultural psychology. First, the distinction between the two fields of inquiry is discussed, and it is argued that a traditional separation of a normative philosophy and a descriptive and explanatory psychology cannot hold, because of the inherent normativity of all things psychological, as argued among others by John Dewey. Second, Innis’ search for a normative frame for cultural psychology is continued by moving in two directions at the same time: One that locates the source of normativity in historically evolved social practices (following the work of Alasdair MacIntyre), and another that looks phenomenologically at the ethical demand arising from human interdependency (following the work of Emmanuel Lévinas and K. E. Løgstrup). Such a two-sided normative frame can possibly acknowledge both the historicity of human morality and the existence of certain universal moral values.