Terrorizing Violence and the Iraq War

Abstract

The extent to which global humanitarian norms can matter in terms of nation-state behavior is a much-debated topic among those who study the international order. This article argues that even long-standing and deeply held norms outlawing the targeting of civilians in war have not stopped the United States from regularly using such violence. In particular, this article examines two instances of what is described as terrorizing violence—targeting civilians in order to create fear or cause intimidation—in the Long Iraq War: the sanctions regime from 1990 to 2002 and the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy used after the 2003 invasion. These cases demonstrate the need for a theoretical perspective that places humanitarian norms within a larger cost–benefit analysis war makers use when considering the deployment of violence. U.S. officials make decisions about war and peace in an economy of political risk. They may choose to undertake policies that violate humanitarian norms when they believe that there could be gains, provided that the potential losses can be kept low if such violence is carried out indirectly or through other less discernible means. Social scientists have important work to do in terms of calling attention to terrorizing violence and bringing it into the light.