The Social Sciences and Two Types of Relativism

Abstract

The article considers two forms of relativism: cognitive and cultural. It is critical of the impact of ‘the new sociology of science’ which in the hands of Paul Feyerabend and others exaggerated the claims of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific change. The article argues that a distinction between scientific and nonscientific arguments can be, and must be, sustained. Secondly, cultural relativism is also considered and criticized. The article considers the legacy of Montaigne, Hume and Weber on modern, primarily anthropological, theories of cultural relativism. Anthropologists are fond of demonstrating that, for example, Western indignation over genital mutilation is only or merely the consequence of socialization into a particular culture. It is argued that, while some rituals may be necessary to inculcate young people into a community, there are rational grounds for rejecting mutilation where alternative rituals would be equally effective. The article therefore rejects both cognitive and cultural relativism as resting on exaggerated or hyberbolic versions of the sceptical consequences of the critical rationalism of Montaigne, Hume and Weber