When does the emergence of a stationary bandit lead to property insecurity?

Abstract

The economic theory of the state is often illustrated using examples in which the emergence of a stationary bandit—a ruler who is able to centralize military and fiscal capacity—improves property security. This article argues that the economic theory of the state also provides insight into the conditions when the emergence of a stationary bandit leads to property insecurity. In our reading of the economic theory of the state, the rise of a stationary bandit is only expected to improve property security writ large when coercive power is unquestioned, political institutions constrain rulers, powerful groups do not dominate the political process, and de facto property institutions are inefficient. The framework clarifies why Afghanistan’s first stationary bandit, Abdur Rahman, maintained state ownership over all land, waged violent repopulation campaigns, and drastically increased taxation before, during, and after centralizing state power from 1880 to 1901, while basic land use rights emerged from 1747 to 1880, a period when the state fell short of a monopoly on coercion.