Affiliation:
1. University of Connecticut
2. George Mason University
Abstract
This article suggests a simple and straightforward explanation for government growth based on the length of time that Congress meets in session. The basic hypothesis is that the more time spent in session, the longer and/or more complex the number of bills enacted into law. Because each bill enacted is likely to entail some spending clauses, the bills enacted in longer sessions are likely to involve larger government spending than those passed in shorter sessions. Using data for both houses of Congress for the period 1947-1982, this article provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that government growth can be partially explained by the length of time that Congress takes in session.
Subject
Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
6 articles.
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