Targeting the Fetal Body and/or Mother–Child Connection: Vital Conflicts and Abortion

Abstract

Is the “act itself” of separating a pregnant woman and her previable child neither good nor bad morally, considered in the abstract? Recently, Maureen Condic and Donna Harrison have argued that such separation is justified to protect the mother’s life and that it does not constitute an abortion as the aim is not to kill the child. In our article on maternal–fetal conflicts, we agree there need be no such aim to kill (supplementing aims such as to remove). However, we argue that to understand “abortion” as performed only where the death of the child is intended is to define the term too narrowly. Respect for the mother, the fetus, and the bond between them goes well beyond avoiding any such aim. We distinguish between legitimate maternal treatments simply aimed at treating or removing a damaged part of the woman and illegitimate treatments that focus harmfully on the fetal body and its presence within the mother’s body. In obstetrics as elsewhere, not all side effects for one subject of intervention can be outweighed by intended benefits for another. Certain side effects of certain intended interventions are morally conclusive. Summary: How should one respond to “vital conflicts” in pregnancy where the mother’s life or health is at risk? We argue that, in addition to avoiding any aim of ending life, one must avoid the similarly unacceptable aims of evicting the baby pre-viability and invading its body, including its placenta, in a lethally harmful way. Even at the cost of real and important benefits for the mother such as increased safety and protection of fertility, we must manage cases always in a way that respects the inviolable bodily rights of both mother and child and crucially, the unique bond between them.