Exploring Accountability Choices in Service Contracts for Collaborative Public Safety Services Provision

Abstract

There is limited evidence on how local governments adopt formal contractual mechanisms to hold partners accountable and mitigate defection in the context of differing power dynamics. What kind of monitoring mechanisms do local governments choose to check opportunism and align incentives as they delegate service provision to another actor? Does the choice of monitoring mechanisms vary if the partner government is another local government, higher-level government, or a non-government actor? Does the choice of monitoring mechanisms used by local governments vary by the nature of service provision? To explore these questions, we examine a randomly selected sample of 163 public service contracts involving local governments in Iowa. Our findings suggest that the use of monitoring mechanisms is not homogenous and varies across different service areas and collaboration directions. In practice, our findings are useful for enhancing local governments’ internal contract management capacity for preventing contract failure, establishing accountability, and mitigating risk.