Unbureaucratic Behavior among Street-Level Bureaucrats: The Case of the German State Police

Abstract

There is an increasing interest in the public management literature in questions related to street-level bureaucrats’ (SLBs) behaviors and attitudes and how these can be influenced. Complex and ambiguous working environments require SLBs to exercise discretion, and thereby bend rules to perform their daily tasks. This study identifies factors influencing SLBs’ rule-bending behaviors for procedural improvements. The concept of unbureaucratic behavior, defined as a rule-bending behavior for procedural improvements, serves as a theoretical basis. Relying on data of 1,003 enforcement officers from the German state police, this study’s findings indicate that SLBs’ unbureaucratic behavior can be influenced by stimulating employees’ voice behavior and their readiness for strategy. Surprisingly, SLBs’ access to resources does not significantly affect their exercise of unbureaucratic behavior.